Introduction
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet."
Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1-2)
Alongside greatly increased adoption of machine learning (ML), its privacy aspects have seen increased attention, both offensively [15, 16, 4, 17] and defensively [1, 12, 13, 14] . In this, the gold-standard definitions of differential privacy (DP) have rightly played a key role [7] . In particular, in industry, DP techniques are being used to enable training of high-utility models that preserve the privacy of training data [9, 2, 5, 14] . While DP provides rigorous privacy guarantees, they take the form of analytic upper bounds that hold equally true for worst-case, artificial adversarially-crafted scenarios as they do for real-world ML applications. As a result, these upperbound DP guarantees can be very loose (i.e., overly pessimistic) and the actual privacy loss in real-world applications may be many orders-of-magnitude lower than what is indicated by DP guarantees; this is especially true in the analysis of ML models trained using DP stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [1] . In addition, the same model may be subjected-without any change or retraining-to different DP analyses that give different upper bounds, making DP guarantees even harder to understand.
In particular, a casual reader of the study by Jayaraman and Evans in USENIX Security 2019 might conclude that "relaxed definitions of differential privacy" should be avoided, because they "increase the measured privacy leakage" in the empirical study of DP machine-learning models [10] . This poster demonstrates that this study is consistent with a different interpretation. Namely, the "relaxed definitions" are strict improvements and they provide orders-of-magnitude tighter guarantees without changing the real-world privacy loss.
An Apparent Paradox?
The privacy of ML models trained by iterative DP-SGD with clipping and Gaussian noise [1] can be analyzed via naïve [6] or advanced [8] composition theorems. They may also be analyzed via more sophisticated and refined definitions such as zero-Concentrated DP (zCDP) [3] and Rényi DP (RDP) [11] .
For a fixed ε upper-bound DP guarantee, Jayaraman and Evans train models that achieve the target ε (irrespective of * Abstract submitted to the USENIX Security Symposium 2019 Poster Session. Full version to appear shortly. utility) under each of the above definitions; subsequently, they measure the models' empirical privacy loss as the success rate of a variant of the membership inference attack in [17] . They find that the empirical attacks have higher success probability for models associated with refined definitions (zCDP and RDP). This result feels like a paradox, as zCDP and RDP were developed to provide stronger privacy guarantees incorporating tighter and more advanced techniques than prior works.
This apparent paradox is resolved as follows. A model trained with DP-SGD has some (unknown) fixed actual privacy guarantee as well as (known) fixed utility. Such an existing model's empirical privacy cannot be changed by its reanalysis under refined definitions (we can only aim to get tighter upper bounds) and this is consistent with the study's results [10] . Conversely, simpler DP definitions have (ordersof-magnitude) greater gaps between the upper-bound ε and actual privacy loss whereas empirical measurements are tied only to the actual privacy loss. By training models to a fixed upper-bound ε under different DP definitions, the models' actual privacy loss will vary wildly (as will their utility). We should expect the lowest empirical attack success rate (and the lowest utility) for the simplest DP definitions' models which is borne out by the study [10] .
A New Interpretation of the Same Data
Consider a subset of Table 5 in Jayaraman and Evans [10] where pairs denote cross-entropy loss and count of attack successes at 5% FPR respectively. On the diagonal, in yellow, the empirical privacy loss can be seen to be approximately the same for models with the same accuracy, as predicted by the above discussion.
Training loss is a proxy for the effective noise added during DP-SGD training; therefore, we can "rotate the table" to fix the noise (or loss) for each row and reformat the table to show (ε upper bound, count of attack successes at 5% FPR).
≈ Loss Naïve
Advanced zCDP RDP .93 (1, 0) (1, 0) (.1, 0) (.05, 0) .65 (50, 16) (50, 73) (5, 45) (.5, 27) .50 (100, 152) (100, 138) (10, 157) (1, 122) From this reformatted table, it is obvious that-as expected-the more advanced DP analysis provides ordersof-magnitude tighter upper-bound guarantees, without changing the empirical privacy loss. (This interpretation has been confirmed by experiments, both new and redone from [10] .)
